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TALK ABOUT TALKING ABOUT CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Adam M. Samaha*
Constitutional theory branches into decision theory and discourse theory.
The former concentrates on how constitutional decisions are or should be
made, the latter on how constitutional issues are or should be discussed.
For its part, originalism began as a method for resolving constitutional
disagreement but it has migrated into discourse theory, as well. Jack
Balkin’s “living originalism” illustrates the move. This essay examines
inclusive versions of originalism like Balkin’s that permit many different
answers to constitutional questions. The essay then suggests pathologies
associated with loose constitutional discourse in general. For instance, a
large domain for constitutional discourse can crowd out nonconstitutional
argument and raise the stakes of disputes in ways that discourage
compromise, creativity, and trust.
Under certain conditions, loose
constitutional discourse is a distraction that cannot moderate societal
divisions. At its worst, loose constitutional discourse retards progress
toward goals that it is supposed to achieve. We still have much to learn
about how constitutional discourse operates in fact and how it interacts with
nonconstitutional argument. At the moment, those inquiries probably are
more important than more talk about how we ought to talk about
constitutional law.

Some people talk, some people decide. Other people talk about deciding,
and still other people talk about talking. Of course talking and deciding are
interrelated,1 but people tend to have a first love in these matters. This is true
in my line of work. Although the title of “professor” designates us as talkers
more than deciders (to the relief of countless citizens), there is plenty of
diversity in what we discuss. For example, much scholarly effort has been
devoted to constitutional decisions, including empirical studies of judicial
behavior, recommendations on interpretive method, and consideration of
institutional choice and design. Significant work also has been done on
constitutional discourse, including studies of rhetoric in popular culture and in
social movements, as well as proposals for conducting rational or otherwise
constructive deliberation on constitutional questions.
*
Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School. This essay was drafted for a
symposium on Jack Balkin’s Living Originalism (2011), hosted by the University of Illinois Law
School on April 8 and 9, 2011. I thank the symposium participants, and especially Jack Balkin, for
their reactions to an earlier draft. I also received helpful feedback from Barry Friedman and Lior
Strahilevitz. Mistakes are mine.
1
Talking involves a kind of decision, talking can constitute a decision, talking can facilitate
other decisions, decisions can facilitate talking, and some decisions are not much more than talk.
Precisely separating the two phenomena is not easy. I hope that undefined categories based on
intuition are adequate.
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To the extent that it remains one single thing, originalism now has a role
in both decision theory and discourse theory. The former role is more
familiar. We are accustomed to enthusiasts promoting originalism as a
method of deciding constitutional questions, especially for judges. It can be
used by other decision-makers, to be sure, but sound constitutional decisions
had been the focus of originalist thinking, regardless. In contrast, some recent
theoretical work on originalism departs from this tradition. Some theorists do
not present their ideas about originalism as comprehensive advice for making
decisions in identifiable cases. Instead they pursue originalism as a way to
ascertain law’s meaning in an isolated sense and without necessarily
recommending much of anything in terms of case results,2 or as a way to
discuss constitutional values regardless of institutional location and without
necessarily taking positions on today’s contested issues. Theories of this kind
are not well-designed to answer direct questions such as, “Is there a judicially
enforceable federal constitutional right to same-sex marriage?”
If developed further in this direction, originalism might self-destruct —
or, putting the thought more cautiously, the new versions of originalism might
confirm an old criticism. A long-standing objection has been that, for one
reason or another, the historical sources on which originalism relies cannot
really dictate answers to interesting questions that people have about
constitutional law in the United States today.3 A darker suspicion sometimes
follows: If one believes that originalism is plagued by indeterminacy, then
one might conclude that people who use originalism to advocate particular
constitutional positions are driven by the same kind of political commitments
that they often claim to exclude from their analysis. What could have been a
simple concern about whether originalism generates answers can turn into a
conviction that originalists are deluded, hypocritical, or deceptive.
But this is no criticism of an originalism that has nothing to do with
decisions. The above complaints are based on an alleged disconnect between
originalism and some pattern of results — the indeterminacy complaint
alleges that that there can be no pattern; the deception complaint alleges that
there is a pattern dictated by politics. But if originalism, rightly understood,
can only ascertain what “equal protection” means in a literary sense without
telling judges what to do with that meaning, or if it can only facilitate a
2
See, e.g., Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823,
1823–24 (1997) (segregating the concept of interpretation from the practice of adjudication);
Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 27–30 (2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244. These theories of interpretation do not fit easily into the
category of discourse theory, but neither do they fit easily into the category of decision theory.
Some theories of interpretation have an abstract quality shared with some discourse theories, and
this is the connection that I am making in the text.
3
See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L.
REV. 204, 218–22 (1980).
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discussion about what “equal protection” should mean today, then many
opponents of originalism can calm down. There would be no superimposed
pattern of results in specific controversies to fuel the deception charge. And
the now-conceded indeterminacy of originalism might even have beneficial
consequences. Originalism might become anyone’s tool. Methodological
détente might come into view. Constitutional debate might become more
civil and disagreement more manageable.
Or perhaps the shift in focus will be a loss of focus, with divisions
remaining equally wide and the task of decision equally urgent. In this essay,
I develop this skeptical attitude toward discourse theory and the new
originalism. I will not show that discourse theorizing is necessarily wasteful,
but I will offer uncomfortably mixed views on recent talk about talking about
constitutional law.4 My principal doubt involves whether a relatively loose
constitutional discourse tends to increase the legitimacy of a political system.
An inclusive discourse that allows for many possible answers to
constitutional questions does sound friendly. But talk can accomplish only so
much, and constitutional talk can raise the stakes of disputes in a way that
discourages rather than encourages compromise, creativity, and trust. If a
large domain for constitutional discourse crowds out nonconstitutional
argument, participants in the political system may find themselves further
divided, not united, by easy recourse to constitutional claims.
I. MORE CONSTITUTION TALK
Converting policy positions into constitutional arguments is a remarkable
practice in the United States. “Constitutional” can mean several things but
here I refer to supreme law, as in a trumping norm that cannot be beaten
within the rules of legal argument. Having supreme law on your side is the
power to overcome all other claims sourced in law. If people believe that
they should abide by the law, it is also the power to make disagreement with
you a source of shame or ethical crisis. Acting against your position must
take the form of extralegal resistance, which is only occasionally valorized
and more often a sign of danger to ordinary people. This helps explain why
even the radical fringes of a society might engage in constitutional argument
before invoking so-called higher law, let alone the virtues of law-breaking.
Thus socialist Charles Schenck’s leaflet relied on the Thirteenth Amendment
as a reason to resist military conscription during World War I,5 and the Black
4

Part of my discomfort stems from my decision to talk about talk about talking about
constitutional law, but this is not the only source of my mixed feelings.
5
“The Constitution of the United States is one of the greatest bulwarks of political liberty. . . .
. A conscripted citizen is forced to surrender his right as a citizen and become a subject. He is
forced into involuntary servitude. He is deprived of the protection given him by the Constitution of
the United States.” Transcript of Record at 4 (insert), Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)
(No. 437).
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Panther Party’s second platform relied on the Second Amendment as a reason
for black people to arm themselves in the face of police brutality.6
Because this practice is so long-standing, deployed in the service of so
many ideologies, and used in so many argument settings, investigating
constitutional discourse as a generalized whole might be worthwhile.7
Interested scholars could carefully identify features of this practice that occur
regardless of context but that distinguish it from nonconstitutional discourse.
From there, we might better understand a significant part of our politics.
Constitution talk probably does structure people’s thinking to some extent.
Mapping this form of discourse should help reveal how political participants
communicate with each other, how their opinions are influenced by
constitutional debate, and when the influence of such talk runs out. Various
contributions have been made along these lines during the last thirty years
and more. The notion of a deliberative democracy once attracted excitement,8
a participatory democratic model vied for attention,9 and the cool kids in
constitutional theory moved outside the courtroom to study the external
origins of acceptable constitutional arguments.10 To the extent that
institution-specific analysis in legal theory11 underemphasizes such crossinstitution phenomena, discourse theory might be a welcome corrective.
Jack Balkin’s recent writings are illustrative. They draw from traditions
in constitutional debate beyond the judiciary, and they recommend ground
rules for the future.12 Balkin wants participants to fit their arguments with the
text of the Constitution of the United States, plus general principles that can
be associated with that document. But otherwise, all bets are off. Discarding
6

“We believe we can end police brutality in our black community by organizing black selfdefense groups that are dedicated to defending our black community from racist police oppression
and brutality. The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States gives a right to bear
arms. We therefore believe that all black people should arm themselves for self defense.” BLACK
PANTHER PARTY PLATFORM AND PROGRAM ¶ 7 (Oct. 1966).
7
I do not mean that constitutional arguments are more common than other forms of argument
in the United States; it seems clear to me that the opposite is true.
8
See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS F. THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996).
9
See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW
AGE (1984).
10
See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV.
2596, 2602 (2003); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social
Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (2001).
11

See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and
Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885 (2003).
12
See JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011); see also JACK BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL
REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD (2011).
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the jargon and shrinking an effusive argument into a few words, his
recommendation is basically this: Divide the document into rules and
standards, follow the rules, and leave the standards vague.13 The Constitution
means no less and no more, although it turns out that we all have a lot of
“constitutional construction” to do after the document’s meaning runs out.
Vague constitutional standards are Balkin’s special concern, and he
emphasizes that we can be faithful to the original meaning of certain parts of
the Constitution only by refusing to replace these standards with the specific
expected applications of past generations. What those generations expected
to happen after enactment is not necessarily what the vague parts of the
enacted text mean, for us or for them.14
Importantly, however, the original meaning of the Constitution is not the
outer boundary of constitutional argument. True, Balkin contends that
treating the Constitution as law requires fidelity to the document’s original
semantic meaning, which is sometimes a vague standard instead of a specific
lesson. In those situations, claiming that the Constitution means something
specific would be disregarding the document, not following it. But Balkin
also knows that abstract standards will not provide clear answers to many
contemporary disputes, and he wants constitutional discourse to deliver at
least some of these answers. This is where “constitutional construction”
comes into play.15
What is constitutional construction, exactly? Theorists sympathetic to the
idea are still toying with various specifications, and there is no consensus on
which institutions ought to be engaged in the practice.16 For Balkin,
13

He also stresses “principles” but the difference between standards and principles is not
terribly dramatic. Balkin’s principles are values that must be considered but that are vague in their
boundaries and in how they apply to particular circumstances. See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM,
supra note 12, at __ (manuscript at 314–17 n. 12) (discussing rules, standards, and principles).
14
See, e.g., id. at __ (manuscript at 105–08). Balkin’s distinction between original meaning
and original expected application is not new. Ronald Dworkin trumpeted roughly the same divide
in the 1980s, distinguishing concepts from conceptions. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 71–
72 (1986) (relating the distinction to levels of abstraction and the exposure of disagreement); see
also RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 120–23 (2006) (distinguishing abstract moral principles
that he finds in certain constitutional provisions from the expected applications of those
provisions). The level-of-generality issue has been around for a long time, too. See, e.g., Laurence
H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV.
1057, 1061–63 (1990) (covering both enumerated and unenumerated rights); Paul Brest, The
Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional
Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1091–92 (1981) (“[A]ll adjudication requires making choices
among the levels of generality on which to articulate principles . . . .”).
15
See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 12, at __ (manuscript at 103) (distinguishing
“interpretation-as-construction” from “interpretation-as-ascertainment”).
16
See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 118–23 (2004) (characterizing constitutional construction as principled gap filling to
resolve cases after interpretation runs out, and indicating substantial judicial involvement); Keith E.
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construction is composed of today’s conventional modes of constitutional
argument and the results reached thereunder, minus the Constitution’s
original semantic meaning. Thus the entire range of arguments that lawyers,
judges, and various advocates now use to make constitutional claims would
remain available under his model. You could still rely on Supreme Court
precedent; I could still rely on drafting history; we both could attempt to
change the culture, the politicians, and the judges who decide constitutional
questions. It is just that many of those efforts would be categorized as
attempts merely to implement the Constitution’s original meaning at a given
point in time, instead of establishing the Constitution’s original meaning for
all time. So, absent formal amendment, the original meaning of the
Constitution would remain stable — but the contemporary construction of
grand phrases such as “equal protection of the laws” and grand concepts such
as “separation of powers” could be contested during each generation and, at
some point, repudiated. In this way, Balkin synthesizes one version of
originalism with one version of living constitutionalism.17
Although mixing sources for constitutional argument is commonplace,
not everyone practices constitutional debate in Balkin’s way and so his effort
has a live normative element. Some originalists might prefer to specify the
meaning of vague clauses in accord with concrete historical examples, or at
least follow the level of generality suggested by that history. Balkin opposes
these positions. Some nonoriginalists might prefer to treat judicial precedent
on par with any other source of supreme law, or at least give these decisions a
strong presumption of correctness. Balkin opposes these positions, too. He
wants to leave major constitutional questions underdetermined by
constitutional meaning as a strategy for increasing the legitimacy of the
system.18 Supposedly, people will debate and disagree over constitutional
Whittington, Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 119, 120–29
(2010) (placing constitutional construction on a continuum between interpretation and change, and
emphasizing nonjudicial action); Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction,
27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 100–08 (2010) (discussing interpretation as the process of ascertaining
linguistic meaning and construction as involving the legal effect of legal texts, without plainly
preferring judicial over nonjudicial involvement in the latter); cf. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.,
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001) (concentrating on judicial doctrine as a mechanism for
implementing constitutional norms). A critique of the emerging interpretation/construction
distinction that separates original semantic meaning from legal meaning is Mitchell N. Berman,
Constitutional Constructions and Constitutional Decision Rules: Thoughts on the Carving of
Implementation Space, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 39 (2010). For a pragmatic view that integrates the
meaning of a constitutional provision with its implementation, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The
Pragmatist’s View of Constitutional Implementation and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L.
REV. F. 173, 175 (2006).
17
Accord Solum, supra note 16, at 117 (observing that living constitutionalism might live
within “the construction zone” that is demarcated by original semantic meaning).
18
See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 12, at __ (manuscript at 402–20) (relying on
several versions of legitimacy).
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norms without permanently splitting into camps of Red and Blue, camps that
aim to establish sole proprietary rights to the Real Constitution. If we use the
Constitution as a common language or source of authority that is not too
restrictive, the argument runs, we might bridge several societal divisions:
cultural divisions over values, status divisions between commoners and legal
professionals, and intergenerational divisions between our judgment and
ancient judgments. Each generation will fight over fundamental questions,
but all sides may point to the Constitution at any time, and the losing side
might have “faith” that the prevailing regime will be “redeemed” in due time.
II. TALK SKEPTICISM
A legitimating constitutional discourse might be a friendly compromise
for a political community that should be held together, but proposals to
achieve it arrive with complications. These complications arise even if we
forget about the particular institutions in which constitutional decisions are
made, and instead ponder how constitutional discourse might be formulated
in more abstract terms. I raise three problems here. The first two involve
pathologies that can arise from relatively loose versions of constitutional
discourse, while the third applies to a conservative version of constitutional
discourse that Balkin seems to endorse.19
A. The Domain Problem
Constitutional debate is not the only game in town. It might seem more
significant, or more interesting, or more thrilling than other types of debate.
19

I put aside three other problems related to the health of our politics.
First, one might think that the character of constitutional discourse will influence how
constitutional text is drafted going forward and that this influence should be defended. I will
assume that new text via Article V or constitutional convention is not likely to happen with
sufficient frequency to make ex ante drafting incentives important (an assumption that seems safe
under loose versions of constitutional discourse, anyway).
Second and more significant, the character of constitutional discourse can have an effect on
the formal amendment rate and, once again, one might fairly demand that any such effect be
defended. A convincing defense would require a thorough comparison of Article V with other
lawmaking procedures, which is not obviously the kind of analysis that excites discourse theorists.
Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Amendments and the Constitutional Common Law, in THE
LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 229
(Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds. 2006) (comparing judicial updating to formal
amendment).
Third, one might think that most of the debatable constitutional questions are not very
important to society’s well-being. Balkin’s version of constitutional discourse might well leave the
most important features of the constitutional order untouched, such as the specific rules regarding
the composition of Congress, while directing excessive attention to a few vague clauses and
principles. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2006). I will charitably
assume that enforcement decisions regarding vague standards in the U.S. Constitution are socially
significant, or that debate over those standards can have legitimating effects regardless of the social
consequences following their enforcement.
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Sometimes it is. But people constantly communicate with each other in
nonconstitutional registers, even when debating issues that are intensely
important to them. Constitutional argument is, in fact, an outlier practice for
normal human beings. Even for law professors, actually. We direct large
amounts of analytic effort to policy questions without consciously or
subconsciously developing constitutional positions. Whether inside or
outside the academy, then, you can discuss the appropriate amount of carbon
dioxide emissions as a personal ethical matter without making a broader
moral claim; you can make a moral claim about human emissions without
making a legal claim; you can make a legal claim about those emissions
without making a constitutional claim; and, if you like the dichotomy
between interpretation and construction, you can make a claim about how the
Constitution should be constructed today to deal with emissions without
making a claim about what the Constitution means forevermore.20
A major challenge for normative discourse theorists is identifying the
correct domain for constitutional argument in relation to nonconstitutional
argument. These two types of discourse should be considered together
because, although they are distinguishable practices, the rules for one are
likely to affect the shape of the other. The challenge is probably more
complicated if we have to make an interpretation/construction dichotomy. In
that case, discourse theorists must defend some particular mix of (1)
argument over constitutional meaning, (2) argument over constitutional
construction, and (3) argument over nonconstitutional policy. Can discourse
theorists persuasively show which proportions of argument types are best?
Can they explain the interrelationships between these types? Have they tried?
As far as I know, the answer to these questions is “no.”
Constitutional discourse does seem meaningfully different from other
kinds of discourse, at least insofar as a constitutional argument involves resort
to norms that are confined to law but that have no superior within law. That
said, figuring out how much constitutional argument is ideal for a political
community of any significant scale is an extraordinarily difficult task. Even
the more modest question whether we ought to have a bit more or a bit less
constitutional argument is tricky. Large difficulties would persist even if we
all agreed on the goal for setting the domain, such as maximizing legitimacy
specified in some way. Overcoming these difficulties demands a reliable
model of human psychology and behavior. The model must be sophisticated
20

I do not want to claim that these categories are easy to delineate or that they do not overlap,
whether in terms of how people think about their arguments or how they express them. In private
correspondence with me, Barry Friedman was right to warn about the difficulties involved in
identifying different types of normative argument, at least as a functional matter. Nevertheless, the
content of these arguments do differ, as I indicate below. They are meaningfully distinct genres,
and they tend to be treated that way by discourse theorists.
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enough to compare the effects of differing amounts and even types of
constitutional claims on achieving the given goal. My sense is that no one
has presented much more than speculation on these matters.21
At the same time, different versions of proper constitutional discourse
will have different effects on the overall amount of constitutional argument.
Take Balkin’s version, which strives to leave open many fundamental
questions for constitutional construction. He sees value in avoiding too much
constitutional settlement. A predictable consequence, however, would be
more constitutional debate than many other alternative versions of
constitutional discourse. Balkin attempts to defend a spacious zone for
constitutional construction in relation to constitutional meaning, but he does
not offer any thoughts about the domain of constitutional argument in relation
to nonconstitutional argument. He is working on one margin but his position
implicates more than one. In fact, at least three dimensions of discourse are
in play. By adopting the interpretation/construction distinction, theorists such
as Balkin beg inquiry into the interactions among two forms of constitutional
argument as well as nonconstitutional argument (which itself is separable into
thinner slices). Claims regarding constitutional construction might gobble up
any number of significant policy disagreements no matter how small we make
the space for constitutional meaning.
The looser the discourse on
constitutional construction becomes, the larger the resulting domain relative
to nonconstitutional discourse, all else equal. Is that a desirable direction in
which to move? Is it better than leaving everything that Balkin calls
constitutional construction to so-called ordinary politics? How can we tell?
Suppose the goal is widespread acceptance of the political and legal
order. Perhaps this is not the highest end for human institutions, but it is an
understandable concern of constitutional theory.22 I would not quickly
concede that discourse or debate necessarily promotes acceptance rather than
hardening positions and increasing alienation. Under some circumstances
and at some point, silence or separation helps settle things. But suppose
21

No doubt there is a floor on the domain of constitutional argument; someone will cast a
claim in constitutional terms so long as the category exists and so long as compliance with law
retains respectability. But recognizing the hardiness of constitutional assertions does little or
nothing to justify some particular size or shape for the domain of such claims.
22
To be clear, simple psychological acceptance and sociological legitimacy are not Balkin’s
only concern. See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 12, at __ (manuscript at 408–09)
(distinguishing sociological, legal, and moral legitimacy). But those are relevant issues for him,
see, e.g., id.; id. at __ (manuscript at 1360) (“Constitutional constructions become durable when
people stop fighting about them and accept them in practice.”), and many others, see, e.g., Richard
H. Fallon Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1795–96 (2005); id. at
1805 (“The Constitution is law not because it was lawfully ratified, as it may not have been, but
because it is accepted as authoritative.”); Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 606, 625 (2008).
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otherwise. Suppose that human beings invariably respect each other more
and accept defeat more gracefully after a good long talk. This conclusion
would stretch the evidence on sociological and psychological legitimacy,23
but let us be generous. We still must know the effect of constitutional talk
before we can begin to evaluate various models for constitutional discourse.

?

legitimacy
(e.g., sociological)

We should ask whether the temperature of social conflict goes up or down
when arguments are easy rather than difficult to convert into constitutional
terms. One hypothesis is that more people will more easily buy into the
system if they all have easy access to constitutional claims, which they may
hope will prevail within a generation or two.24 But there is no reason to leave
that suggestion untested. A plausible competing hypothesis is that few people
truly care much about events that will occur generations after their death, let
alone merely possible events. Although people regularly talk about their care
for future generations (“our children’s children” and all that), it is difficult to
find reliable evidence of personal sacrifice that is best explained by the desire
to benefit the future.25 For the political left, an illustration might be
23

Cf. David L. Markell, Tom Tyler & Sarah F. Brosnan, What has Love Got to Do with It?:
Sentimental Attachments and Legal Decision-Making 5–6, 15–23 (Sept. 7, 2011) (concluding from
a web-based survey of a non-random sample of “elites” (n = 228) interested in land-use disputes
that, (1) for protecting monetary values, positive responses were associated with the perceived
neutrality of the judge, and (2) for protecting sentimental values, positive responses were associated
with trust in the judge, which partly turned on opportunities for voice and signs of respect),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1923807. The survey also indicated that court judgments
garnered the highest overall level of acceptance among five dispute-resolution procedures tested,
but that courts placed third behind referenda and negotiation in protecting sentimental value. See
id. at 18.
24
See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 12, at __ (manuscript at 402–20).
25
Among the empirical contributions on this topic, consider, for instance, Arthur C. Brooks,
Do People Really Care About the Arts for Future Generations?, 28 J. CULTURAL ECON. 275, 283
(2004) (unable to reject the hypothesis that people are “purely intergenerationally egoistic” in their
support for public art); Arthur C. Brooks, Public Goods and Posterity: An Empirical Test of
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convenient doubts about climate change that developed once economic
recession made immediate sacrifice for long-term gain more burdensome.
For the political right, an illustration might be the convenient belief that
Keynesian stimulus programs were necessary to prevent recession from
turning into depression, whatever the cost in future debt burdens.
Yet another competing hypothesis would be equally devastating. Perhaps
constitutionalizing arguments makes the stakes of a given dispute appear
higher than otherwise.26 And perhaps the perception of high stakes drives
down the probability of compromise and trust. Although relevant empirical
and experimental evidence is hardly consistent or conclusive, there is plenty
of reason to believe that high-stakes questions often prompt people to fight
harder and take fewer risks on innovative proposals for reconciliation.27 One
can hope that people concentrate on the public good when the problems they
face escalate in importance, and this no doubt happens under certain
conditions, but discourse theories ought to rest on more than optimism. The
easy conversion of policy positions into constitutional claims might make the
urge to prevail over others ever stronger. Supreme law would be at stake,
after all. If all of this is true, any causal link between loose constitutional
discourse and a cohesive political community would disappear. The
polarizing effects could easily outrun the cohesive effects.
True, in its most extreme version, loose constitutional discourse probably
would not increase the stakes of argument. Indeed the loosest imaginable
constitutional discourse could eliminate the stakes entirely by eroding any
difference with ordinary political argument. If every policy position could
Intergenerational Altruism, 13 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. 165, 173–74 (2003) (testing whether reported
charitable giving to social services, education, religion, and politics have an intergenerationally
altruistic component and answering “yes,” but only narrowly and only for the last two); David
Popp, Altruism and the Demand for Environmental Quality, 77 L. ECON. 339, 348 (2001) (finding
some evidence that people value environmental amenities both for themselves and for future
generations).
26
Contrast prospective gains and losses, however. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 344 (1984) (finding that people
are risk-seeking when facing losses and risk-averse when facing gains); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 118–19 (1996) (similar);
Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163, 167
(2000) (stating that the reverse is true for low probability losses and gains).
27
See, e.g., Olof Johansson-Stenman, Minhaj Mahmud & Peter Martinsson, Does Stake Size
Matter in Trust Games?, 88 ECON. LETTERS 365, 367–68 & tbls. 1 & 2 (2005); Charles A. Holt &
Susan K. Laury, Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1644, 1647, 1653–54
(2002); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 4–5, 17 (1984); see generally Adam M. Samaha, Low Stakes and Constitutional
Interpretation, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 305, 322–26 (2010) (reviewing theory and research on lowstakes versus high-stakes decision making); cf. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE at x (1991) (decrying the “exaggerated absoluteness, . .
. hyperindividualism, . . . [and] insularity” of rights talk in the United States).
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easily be recast as a viable constitutional argument at any point in time, it is
unclear what would be gained from the label. An argument could not aspire
to greater durability on account of its constitutional status, for instance; no
one could win a constitutional argument for any measurable length of time.
Characterizing your argument as constitutional might only signal strong
feelings, or do nothing at all. However, neither Balkin nor others working on
discourse theory seems to water down the significance of winning a
constitutional argument that much. Balkin’s suggestion appears to be that
prevailing constitutional constructions should be less difficult to change than
the Constitution’s original meaning yet more difficult to change than
nonconstitutional policy. This difference between construction and policy is
not immediately apparent in Balkin’s book; his subject is constitutional
discourse, not nonconstitutional discourse. But this is the problem.
Finally, relatively loose standards for constitutional discourse might have
other alienating and aggravating effects. Surely some advocates will use
constitutional arguments strategically, knowing that some others will take
their points more seriously in that form. As well, in attempting to prevent
undesirable outcomes entailed by the constitutional arguments of others,
objections that would have been cast in ordinary policy terms will more likely
be translated into the language of constitutional law. Strategic and defensive
uses of constitutional dialogue are not without social benefit; they generate
useful information, for instance. Nonetheless, they seem to include a kind of
cost to which discourse theorists should be sensitive. These practices involve
opportunism and the embrace of arguments that do not reflect the honest
feelings of their proponents. In a significant sense, they are inauthentic. It is
worth wondering whether a loose constitutional discourse that is inflated by
strategic uses can produce a more cohesive political community, to say
nothing of a community whose cohesion is morally justified.28 Ordinarily,
language is not the kind of common resource that can be overused. But the
kind of language envisioned by constitutional discourse theorists might well
be too attractive for the social good.
Nationalists and patriots, if no others, might be tempted to cite the United
States as evidence that loose constitutional discourse works. This country has
not split apart despite significant diversity and fundamental disagreement —
not for more than a century, anyway. The Constitution is indeed a unifying
icon, despite or because its details are not widely known.29 In addition,
28

I have in mind a connection to John Rawls’s idea of public reason derived from an
overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines, see JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 132–40
(1999); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 136–37 (1996), which might not, in fact, be adequate
to the task of achieving sociological legitimacy in a diverse society insofar as people feel alienated
from the public reasons available to them.
29
See MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF 3 (1986) (“[F]or almost two
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theorists such as Balkin are not asking for constitutional debate to change in a
radical way. And, compared to some originalists, Balkin might be allotting
far more territory to constitutional construction than to the even higher stakes
domain of constitutional meaning. On the other hand, only those who are
satisfied with today’s levels of political friction and polarization will take the
United States as a success story on legitimacy. Cautionary tale might be the
more fitting description. An unresolved question, moreover, is how best to
maximize particular values such as political legitimacy with the least social
dysfunction possible. Normative discourse theorists who accept the status
quo are not demonstrating that we cannot do better. To do that, they will
have to show that the character of constitutional debate cannot be changed by
design, that such change would be too costly, or that change is unneeded
because we happen to have the optimal mix of constitutional and
nonconstitutional debate. Good work remains undone on each point.
B. The Variance Problem
A second problem has the same source as the domain problem. A loose
constitutional discourse will not only attract a large number of policy
arguments, it will encompass many conflicting viewpoints as well. Indeed, a
socially important mission for normative discourse theory is building forums
in which people with different views may understand and peacefully converse
with each other. Therefore, the common “language” must be quite thin. It
must not commit any of the (desired) participants to any of the contested
positions that they happen to hold. As the variance in opinion that must be
accommodated becomes higher, the rules of discourse must become thinner.
To the extant that an inclusive model of constitutional discourse is advocated
as a constructive response to ideological diversity, the model cannot be very
confining in terms of acceptable constitutional positions.
At the same time, there will be losers. Many of them. Decisions will be
made that privilege one constitutional position over another, at least in the
short run. Hence the decision to forgo health insurance will be sheltered from
legislative prohibition, or instead subject to legislative policy choices, or even
abolished to support a constitutional right to health care. The decision to
terminate a pregnancy will be sheltered from legislative prohibition, or
instead subject to legislative policy choices, or even criminalized as a matter
of constitutional law to avoid underinclusive murder statutes. These are only
some conceivable constitutional positions that would be accommodated
within a loose discourse. They cannot all prevail at the same time. Someone
will lose (even if discourse theorists do not specify how the constitutional
centuries, [the Constitution] has been swathed in . . . a fulsome rhetoric of reverence more than
offset by the reality of ignorance.”); Max Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J.
1290, 1294, 1298 (1937) (noting the role of symbol in fostering order).
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decision will be made).
Now we have a hitch in the peacemaking function of loose constitutional
discourse. None of the losers can be convinced that they ought to accept their
losses just because they accept the Constitution. Constitutional law, however
supreme, would have no such persuasive force. The open dialogue was
designed to avoid precisely this power. To be sure, there are reasons to doubt
that many people stop fighting for their positions when other people tell them
that the Constitution is against them. I am sympathetic to those doubts. But
any such pacifying effect seems to be sacrificed by loose constitutional
dialogue. We are left to wonder what legitimating value losers will assign to
the message not that they were wrong about the true meaning of the
Constitution, but rather that participants in the debate all began with the same
indeterminate resources for legal argument. What difference can that make?
Will it make acquiescence more likely or more justified because the result
was not predetermined or not predictable?
Lotteries sometimes garner support on these grounds,30 but law covers
both more and less of the territory in which randomized social decisions are
defensible. Although it might be a calming sign of respect when political
opponents use the same constitutional language, this is not always true.
Boxers mimic handshakes at the beginning of their bouts without eliminating
an ensuing brutality. Even if we think that tagging shared cultural elements
has a unifying effect, it is not obvious why the effect would be greater or
different than saluting the flag or tipping hats before the debate begins.
Perhaps constitutional lingo is a fairly elaborate way of sending those signals,
which could be jettisoned for purposes of simplification. Personally, I am not
confident of this view but neither can I find obvious evidence on the other
side. Serious discourse theorists should grapple harder with the mechanisms
of legitimacy before concluding that the ability to formulate a vast spectrum
of arguments in originalist terms will make any difference.31
Pointing to roughly equal chances in the short run is not the only way to
promote a loose constitutional discourse, however. Another way to win the
allegiance of today’s losers is by emphasizing the long run.32 Consider one of
the asserted benefits of a large domain for constitutional construction:
Provisional settlements that merely implement the original meaning of the
30

See Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 18–21
(2009) (setting out justifications for randomization, including equal claims to an indivisible good).
31
This variance problem becomes worse as the domain of constitutional argument becomes
larger, but the problem exists as long as the domain has a significant reach.
32
Both Balkin and Mike Seidman suggest this possibility. The latter developed his argument
ten years ago in LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 55 (2001).
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Constitution are supposed to be vulnerable over time. Once participants in
constitutional debate understand that any constitutional construction can be
reformed with sustained argument and political mobilization, that only a
partial framework for politics and government is even arguably fixed, then
losers might have hope of turning the tables. For similar reasons, winners
might be more restrained within a system of loose constitutional dialogue.
They cannot be sure of lasting victory. They might have to prepare for life on
the outskirts of political power.
If this sounds like rotation in office under conditions of electoral
competition, it should.33 Essentially the same arguments can be made that
competitive elections with organized political parties can increase
sociological legitimacy to sustainable levels. The resemblance ought to
prompt us to ask again about the added value of loose constitutional
discourse, especially insofar as it holds out the promise of change through the
channels of politics. Constitutional constructions are, at least in part, the
products of popular opinion, social movements, and interest groups acting
with and through officeholders, policy agendas, and program design. One of
the contributions of constitutional discourse theory is a reminder that ordinary
politics and constitutional law are inseparable practices. The more these two
practices are connected, however, the less special legitimizing force loose
constitutional discourse can possibly have.
Elections, however, take place in much shorter increments.
Constitutional dialogue is ordinarily not modeled to have any such immediate
effect, as I indicated above. Recognizing that change in constitutional
constructions generally takes much longer and much more effort than change
in ordinary policy opens up challenging questions about the relationship
between the pace of legal change and the level of system legitimacy. Is it
more soothing to think that your loss is reversible in the next election cycle,
or in the next generation? If the response is that constitutional victories are
supposed to be more entrenched than other political victories, and so
constitutional losers rightly can be asked to wait, then I think the losers’ reply
will be that a loose constitutional dialogue minimizes the difference between
constitutional and ordinary political victories. A dialogue loose enough to
encompass the positions of a diverse political community implies that many if
not all significant political victories can be recharacterized as constitutional
commitments — and vice versa. One side’s constitutional victory will be
33

See generally Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law,
Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1835 (2009). On the possibly
constructive role of courts in maintaining these systems, see, for example, Samuel Issacharoff,
Constitutional Courts and Democratic Hedging, 99 GEO. L.J. 961 (2011), and Matthew C.
Stephenson, “When the Devil Turns . . .”: The Political Foundations of Independent Judicial
Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 59 (2003).
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another side’s ordinary political victory, and possibly an illegitimate one at
that. And so we might hope that people keep singing the national anthem or
start sporting flag pins to show membership in the same political community,
and avoid the trouble of translating their arguments into a constitutional
language that risks encompassing too much and accomplishing too little.
C. The Conservatism Problem
Certain versions of constitutional dialogue are not nearly as inclusive as
the above concerns suggest. The acceptable outcomes from constitutional
dialogue can be limited to what seems normal, or mainstream, or
nondisruptive. If what started as a big tent gets smaller, there is the
possibility for greater guidance on particular constitutional questions. This
might be counted as a gain. But any advantage from clarity comes with the
disadvantage, once again, of losing the losers’ allegiance to the system. This
risk is quite difficult to eliminate. It will arise from those who object to the
narrowed set of acceptable outcomes and also from those who more generally
oppose a conservative version of constitutional dialogue. While loosening the
dialogue might garner more signatories, making the dialogue more outcomedeterminative will multiply its opponents.34
Balkin’s work, in the end, exemplifies this more conservative option.
Each application of his text-plus-principle approach — to the privileges or
immunities clause, to the equal protection clause, to the commerce clause —
is a defense of some part of the status quo.35 If you felt uneasy about the
ability of conventional constitutional analysis to unleash the federal
government against the Great Depression and Jim Crow, and also to condemn
school segregation and abortion regulation, text-plus-principle is supposed to
place those outcomes in respectable legal standing. If instead you were
comfortable with any of the opposite outcomes, Balkin’s analysis can only
make you feel uncomfortable (or unmoved). His conclusions are not
presented as reasonable possibilities. They are the product of extensive
argument designed to convince the reader of one particular conclusion after
another, so long as the reader takes this form of constitutional discourse as
given.
But I doubt that anyone will, and Balkin is not asking for that sort of
charity. His argument for his form of constitutional discourse rests on its
ability to bring people into the fold. The argument is supposed to be a
34
This section might suggest that legitimacy-seeking discourse theorists have been unfairly
placed in a dilemma, whereby constitutional dialogue is always either too loose or too restrictive. I
accept that there might be a way to thread the needle, but I also believe it is worth presenting both
sorts of concerns, along with the general question regarding the value of constitutional discourse
compared to other forms of debate.
35
See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 12, at __ (manuscript chs. 9–11).
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response to the risk that people will further divide, polarize, and smash into or
spin away from each other. Today, however, there is no consensus that
expansion of the regulatory and welfare state represented by the New Deal
and the Great Society is constitutionally permissible. If the goal is to
convince people that text-plus-principle dialogue is able to produce mutually
exclusive constitutional outcomes, one would like to see the method used to
produce unorthodox results. If the method is not capable of achieving this —
if it cannot be used to generate conflicting answers to significant
constitutional questions but instead only offers the possibility of serious
change over generations — then adherence becomes far more costly to
millions of people making choices now.
In application as opposed to theory, Balkin’s text-plus-principle might not
be well-designed for generating serious indeterminacy and perhaps better
suited to validating the status quo against reform campaigns with short time
horizons. In that case, this roughly defined model for loose talk about the
Constitution which seemed so ideologically inclusive will function as a
conservative demand that advocates of change slow down. The restraints on
constitutional discourse which seemed so modest will become quite serious.
And the implications for today’s constitutional decisions will become quite
clear. Even if the Constitution’s original meaning remains radically loose,
constitutional construction can take back almost all of the slack. That new
constitutional constructions are easier to achieve than success in the nearly
dormant Article V amendment process will be little comfort to those
Americans who believe that the existing system has abandoned the Real
Constitution. To them, constitutional construction probably seems like the
problem, not the solution.
CONCLUSION
Much of the foregoing has been critical. I would like to close on a note of
humility. Dealing with fundamental disagreement is not easy. It is almost
certainly a problem that must be managed rather than solved. The difficulties
are so deep that many ideas on the matter are better than few, and therefore
we can welcome the efforts of Balkin and other discourse theorists. At the
same time, they are only part of a larger intellectual community interested in
when and why people accept decisions with which they disagree. Prominent
scholarship on legitimacy has yet to deliver a comprehensive answer on the
particular conditions for acceptance.36 Specialists in human behavior are
36

See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 4–7, 161–63 (2006 ed.); Tom R.
Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. OF PSYCH. 375
(2006) (summarizing research and emphasizing procedural justice); James R. Kluegel & David S.
Mason, Fairness Matters: Social Justice and Political Legitimacy in Post-Communist Europe, 56
EUR.-ASIA STUDIES 813, 826 (2004) (“[T]here is a close connection between economic success and
political support in these countries [based on prior studies] . . . . But it is clear from the results here
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probably only beginning to understand exactly how people conduct
productive discussions that reconcile more than they aggravate, along with
the circumstances under which people will agree to acquiesce despite
opposition from the loudest voices of conscience. Something similar can be
said about those who study the dynamic interaction of constitutional and
nonconstitutional politics, and of legal and nonlegal institutions. Whatever
the most persuasive answers to the issues surrounding fundamental societal
disagreement, discourse theorists in general and constitutional discourse
theorists in particular are unlikely to produce those answers on their own.
Most likely, they will have to talk to others who are talking in a different
language.
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that economic success alone will not necessarily guarantee popular support for the new
governments.”); Mitchell A. Seligson, The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy, 64 J.
POLIT. 408, 423–26, 430–31 (2002) (finding that reported experience with corruption is associated
with the erosion of trust in four political regimes under study, albeit within a statistical model that
explained relatively little of the variation in the data); cf. Wendy Nelson Espeland & Mitchell L.
Stevens, Commensuration as a Social Process, 24 ANN. REV. SOCIOLOGY 313, 330–31 (1998)
(pointing out that, among other effects, the use of quantitative analysis can win legitimacy while
diminishing the autonomy of elite decision makers).
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